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Article 4

JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT -

IN WHICH JUDICIAL

OFFSPRING RECEIVE A CONGRESSIONAL CONFIRMATION
From the day that the Administrative Procedure Act of
19461 became law, the tempo of legal psycho-analysis, striving vigorously to unravel the real meaning behind this congressional jargon (euphemistically referred to as "the
Act"), has ever accelerated. Articles fill the law reviews 2
and the bar journals 8; symposiums are held to explain the
new congressional nostrum guaranteed to cure "bureaucratitis" the easy way; I and even congressmen indulge in post
facto appraisal of what their intentions were (or would have
been, if they must have had to intend anything) when they
gave to us the statute.5 Since a teacher in so functional and
experimental a field as administrative law must have, by necessity, if not by choice, a proclivity toward legal "Freudism," this writer must join the ranks of those who are busying
1 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U. S. C. A. Appendix 1001 (1947).
2 See, e. g., Brown, The Federal "Administrative Procedure Act;' 1947 Wis.
L. R. 66 (1947); Cohen, Legislative Injustice and the Supremacy of "Law", 26
NEB. L. Rxv. 323 (1947); Kaufman, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 26
BOSTON UNiv. L. R. 479 (1946); Nathanson. Some Comments on the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 ILL. L. Rxv. 368 (1946). This writer has to confess a previous contribution to the collective palaver. Scanln, Separation of Functions in
the Administrative Process, 15 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 63 (1946).
3 See, e. g., Findling, N. L. R. B. Procedures: Effects of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 33 A. R. A. J. 16, (1947); Goding, The Impact of the Administrative Procedure Act on the Administration of the Federal, Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, 2 FOOD, DRUG AND Cosumnc LAW QUARTESLY 139, (1947); Haines,
Why Did Federal Commissions Adopt New Rules? 38 Punmc Umanxs FORTNIGHTLY 593 (1946). Even our British brethren were not spared. See Schwartz,
The American Administrative Procedure Act, 63 LAw QUARTmEY Rviw (Eng.)
43 (1947).
4 Symposium on Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the Administrative Agencies, conducted by the New York University School of Law, Feb. 1-8,
1947. Reported in Naw YoRx U v. SCHOOL oF LAW INsTTruTE PRoCmiNGs,
vol. VII. (1947).
5 Gwynne, Architecture of the New Administrative ProcedureAct, 32 A. B. A.
J. 550 (1946); McCarran, Improving Administrative Justice, 32 A. B. A. J. 827
(1946).
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themselves with the legal "double-crosstics" involved in any
attempt to assay what the Administrative Procedure Act was
meant to accomplish, and, more important, what it probably
will accomplish.
However, readers of this effort might be relieved somewhat
to find that it will be confined to an analysis of Section 10 of
the Act, which deals with judicial review of administrative
action. This selection is dictated in part by limitations of
time and space; but more proximately is caused by a personal belief that it is the sphere of judicial review in which the
controversy over the proper place of administrative action in
our jurisprudence best can be apprehended. Let it be stated
from the outset that it is the writer's personal opinion that:
(1) the Administrative Procedure Act was not intended to
upset the existing rules or principles governing judicial re-,
view of administrative action; (2) nor will the federal courts
(especially the present Supreme Court) allow it to upset
those rules and principles. This is not an a priori postulate
laid down out of a devotion to the efficiences of administrative government; rather it is the conclusion of a syllogism
whose major premise is that congress was aware of the existing principles of judicial review when it passed the Act, and
whose minor premise is that congress merely restated them..
While this view is not unique, having the welcome agreement of the Justice Department,' nevertheless it is far from
being received with unanimity. Opposing views run the
gamut from that of outraged scholars in the field of public administration who regard the passage of the Act as a death
sentence to all future efficient administrative effort,7 to those
of some of the more tenacious "diehards" among the sup6

ATTORNEY GENRA's MAUAL ow THE ADmnISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT, pre-

pared by the Dept. of Justice, p. 9 (1947); see also INTERPRETATION OF ATToRNEz
GENEAL, SEN. REP. 752, 79th Cong. 1st Sess. 43 (1945); Letter of Attorney General of Oct. 19, 1945--Id. at 38.
7 Blachly and Oatman, Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 34 GEO. L. J.
407 (1946); Blackly, Sabatage of the Administrative Process, 6 PuBr~ic AD:-nisTRATION REVIEw 213 (1946).

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

porters of government exclusively by law suit, who see in the
Act only a gentle slap on the bureaucratic wrist when they
would prefer a kick in the bureaucratic buttock.6 In between
these extremes are those who advance-a modified in terrorem
argument that Congress did not mean to emasculate administrative action, but that its choice of words was not only unfortunate, but positively dangerous; ' and those who with polite, but conservative firmness insist that the Act lays down
new rules for the judicial review of administrative action.10
These others the writer leaves to their own devices. The
purpose of this article will be to demonstrate through a provision by provision analysis of Section 10, -that the Act did
not change the existing law of judicial review, either by increasing the availability of judicial remedy, or by widening
the scope of judicial review. The Act undoubtedly will result in reforms of certain administrative procedures, but it
will not upset the rubric of judicial review which the federal
judiciary has fashioned piecemeal, and from which it has no
intention of deviating, even though its homemade precepts
also now have been expressed; however opaquely, in statutory flapdoodle.
General Exceptions To Section 10 1
Because of their controlling importance, the provisions of
Section 10 will be set forth in the main text as they are taken
up. Section 10 begins:
8 See remarks of Mr. Gwynne on the floor of the House, 92 Cowo. REc., 5761,
May 24, 1946.
9 Kaufman, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 502; Shine, Administrative Procedure
Act: JudicialReview "Hotchpotch"? 36 GEo. L. J. 16 (1947).
10 Dickinson, Administrative Procedure Acts: Scope and Grounds of Broadened Judicial Review, 33 A. B. A. J. 550 (1947). Professor Dickinson expounded the
same thesis in more detailed fashion at the New York Univ. Law School Symposium, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 546.
11 In addition to the general exceptions discussed in the text, it should also
be noted that Section 10 is inapplicable in two other general situations. (1) It is
inapplicable to those agencies and functions which are exempted -by section 2 (a)
from all the provisions of the Act except section 3, which deals with publication
of administrative action. Included in this category are functions conferred by the
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Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by law committed to
agency discretion...
There can be no doubt of the constitutionality of a statute
which precludes judicial review of certain administrative action. 2 The more difficult task is to ascertain when a statute
is intended to preclude judicial review. Statutes which by
their own terms expressly preclude judicial review, while
rare, still can be found. One such statute gives finality to
certain decisions of the Administrator of Veterans Affairs and
forbids judicial review in such cases.'" This denial of judicial review has been held constitutional because it applied
to a "gratuity".' 4 There are also other similar statutes expressly forbidding judicial review.' 5 As far as such statutes
are concerned, it is clear from the very words of the introductory clause of Section 10 that no change is contemplated.
This conclusion is supported by the only case on the point
which has been decided since the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act.'"
selective Training and Service Act of 1940, the Contract Settlement Act of 1944,

,he Surplus Property Act of 1944, the Veterans Emergency Housing Act of 1946,
the Sugar -Control Extension Act of 1947, and the Housing and Rent Act of 1948.
(2) Section 10 would appear also to be inapplicable to cases pending in the courts
on Sept. 11, 1946 (the date the Act became operative). At least this is the position taken by the Justice Dept. and it does appear correct since an allegation to
the opposite effect has been raised only to receive the silent disapproval of the
Supreme Court in an unsuccessful certiorari petition. May Department Stores v.
N. L. R. B .... U. S., 67 S. Ct. 107, 92 L. Ed. 74 (1947).
12 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 56 S. Ct. 720,
80 L. Ed. 1033 (1936).
13 48 STAT. 9 (1933), 38 U. S. C. 705 (1940).
14 Barnett v. Hines, 105 F. (2d) 96 (App. D. C., 1939); cert. den. 308 U. S.
573, 60 S. Ct. 87, 84 L. Ed. 480 (1939). See also Van Home v. Hines, 122 F.
(2d) 207 (App. D..C., 1941).
15 See, e. g., Packers and Stockyards Act, 56 STAT. 372 (1942), 7 U. S. C. A.
A ,p. 217 (a) (1947) in which the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture authorizing the charging and collection of fees for the inspection of brands at a stockyard subject to the Act is made final and "should not be subject to judicial review."
16 -International Union et al. v. Bradley, 75 F. Supp. 394 (App. D. C. 1948)
The decision did not mention the A. P. Act; it merely followed the precedents of
the Barnett and Van Home cases, op. cit. supra note 14.
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More challenging an inquiry is presented when we examine statutes which are said "impliedly" to preclude judicial review. Are such statutes still to be interpreted as ruling out judicial review, now that the Administrative Procedure Act is law? Statutes of these types, whose terms have
been judicially construed to bar judicial review, are fairly numerous. For instance, the Supreme Court has held that review of the National Mediation Board's certification of representatives for collective bargaining was beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts.' 7 Moreover, the courts have
held in other situations that they have no power, or only limited power, to review "inherently" administrative determinations, such as matters concerned with the use of public
lands, 1 8 granting of second class mailing privileges, exclusion
of aliens, and government purchasing.' 9 It is not the province of this article to examine all the possible classifications
of administrative action which permit the parent statute to
be interpreted as precluding judicial review. The question
more pertinent here is whether the Administrative Procedure
Act has restricted such statutes? To this the writer must
answer in -the negative. The strongest argument in support
of this assertion is to point out that the introductory provision of Section 10 has received an expanding exposition during the evolution of the Act. Originally confined to situations
where "statutes expressly preclude judicial review"," it was
changed to its present form with the word "expressly" omitted (Italics supplied). Moreover, the appendix to the At17 Switchmen's Union v. Nat. Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297, 64 S. Ct. 95, 88
L. Ed. 61 (1943).
'
22

United States v. Ickes, 101 F.

(2d) 248 (App. D. C., 1938).

An excellent discussion of situations where judicial review defers to administratiye discretion is contained in the Final Report of the Att'y. General's
Comm. on Administrative Procedure (1941) at p. 86 (hereinafter referred to as

REP. ATT'y. GEN.)
20 SENATE JUDICIARY CornrTTE PRINT of June 1945. This change in wording to insure the continuance of judicial inaction under certain statutes seems to
have been overlooked by Blackly and Oatman who conclude that Congress meant
to preclude judicial review only where the parent statute expressly bars it. Blachly
and Oatman, op. cit. supra note 7, p. 427.
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torney General's statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee cited the Switckman Union case, supra, as an example bf
a congressional manifestation impliedly to preclude judicial
review." Thus, it may be fairly concluded -that Congress
was aware of, and took specific action to preserve the situations where statutes impliedly precluded judicial review.
This conclusion seems to be justified by cases decided since
the passage of the Act. In Chicago & Southern Air Lines,
Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp.,2 2 the Supreme Court held that
a provision of the Civil Aeronautics Act authorizing judicial
review of described orders of the Civil Aeronautics Board
does not include those which grant or deny applications by
citizen carriers to engage in overseas and foreign air transportation and which are subject to approval by the President. Therefore, this latter type order was not reviewable.
While the decision probably also could be rested on the
ground that such orders of the Civil Aeronautics Board were
not final orders, and while it is also true that no Administrative Procedure Act objection was raised in the proceedings
before the Court, nevertheless, the language of the majority
opinion reiterated the principle that "statutes which employ
broad terms to confer power of judicial review are not always
to be read literally".2 3 It seems clear from a reading of the
opinion that the Court will continue their philosophy of judicial self restraint in taking up review of administrative action. Administrative action which, from its "nature, from
context of act, or from relation of judicial power to the subject matter",' is inappropriate for review will continue to be
21 SEsr. REP. 752, 79th Cong. 1st Sess. 43-44 (1945) (hereinafter cited as
SEsr. REP.); Administrative Procedure Act-Legislative History, SEN. Doc. No.
248, 79th Cong. 2nd Sess. 229-230 (1945) (hereinafter cited as Sasw. Doe.)
22 .... U. S...... , 68 S. Ct. 431, 92 L. Ed. 367 (1948). The particular provi-

sion at issue was section 601 of the Civil Aeronautics Act. 52 STAT. 973 (1938),
49 U. S. C. 401 et seq. (1940).
23 68 S. Ct. 431, 434.

24 Ibid. In the instant case the opinion stressed the differences between air
transportation and other, forms of transportation, the relation of aviation to national security, and the broad character of presidential control over the final order
of the Board.
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so, the Administrative Procedure Act to the contrary not2 5

withstanding.

The second provision of exception to-Section 10 includes
"agency action-by law committed to agency discretion."
There are many types of agency action which have been held
to be discretionary and not reviewable, save where the discretion granted has been overreached. A paramount example is
the discretion lodged in the N. L. R. B. to refuse to issue a
complaint.26 There are many others, including the discretionary authority of the Civil Aeronautics Board to dismiss
complaints filed by municipalities under section 401 (h) of
the Civil Aeronautics Act, and the many discretionary powers
vested in the Secretary of Agriculture under the various acts
with whose administration he is' entrusted.
Whether a
statute vests discretion in an administrative official or agency
is simply a question of the intent of Congress as disclosed by
the act under examination." Our inquiry is directed at finding out whether the Administrative Procedure Act allows this
discretion to continue undisturbed. The sometimes captious
critics from the land of -public administration seem to think
that' unless the parent statute expressly provides that there
shall be use of discretion, then by force of the Administrative
Procedure Act there must now be judicial review afforded. 9
While it is true that this view finds some minutiae of support
25 See also In Re Certificates of Service et al. 73 F. Supp. 725 (S. D. N. Y.
1947) where a federal court held that the decision of the Coast Guard Commandant on an appeal from maritime casualty investigators boards is final and beyond
the authority of the court to examine.
26 Jacobsen v. National Labor Relations Board, 120 F. (2d) 96 (C. C. A. 3rd
1941).
27 See Hunter, The Administrative Procedure Act In Its Applications To The
Functions Of The Department Of Agriculture, Institute Proceedings, op. cit. supra
note 4 at 344, 375.
28 Z. & F. Assets Corp. v. Hull, 311 U. S. 470, 61 S. Ct. 391, 85 L. Ed. 288
(1941).

29 Blachly, Sabotage of the Administrative Process, op. cit. sura note 7; 213,
226.
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in a confusing coigressional colloquy during the debates,"0
this writer believes the stronger evidence refutes that conclusion.
The words "by law" are clearly more broad in their scope
than if the phrase "by statute" had been used, indicating a
congressional purpose to exempt agency discretion previously
precluded by judicial decision. and not to restrict the exemption to cases where the statute expressly made an administrative action purely discretionary. In addition, the congressional committees had before them the interpretation of the
Attorney General, in which it was made quite clear that matters committed partly or wholly to agency discretion were
not now reviewable under Section 10."' Additional support
can be cleared from the fact that objection was early raised
in committee that the Act might be interpreted to permit judicial review of the discretionary authority of the N. L. R. B.
not to institute proceedings in labor cases. Since the objection was answered by citing the agency discretion exception
to Section 10, it seems clear that the exception was meant to
encompass previous situations. 2 While the point is yet to be
tested in the federal courts, none have demonstrated that
they intend to intrude in matters of administrative discretion."
Concluding the appraisal of the congressional intention behind the introductory phrase to Section 10, it can be stated
30 See the interrogation of Sen. McCarran by Sen. Donnell concerning the
applicability of the Act to cases of agency discretion. 92 Cong. Rec., 2195 (March
12, 1946). The most logical interpretation of Sen. McCarran's replies on that occasion would seem to be that under the Act an administrative agency could not exercise its discretionary powers arbitrarily.
31
32

SEN. REP., 44; SEN. Doc., 230.
SEN. Comm. PaINT, 19, ff (3); SEN. Doc., 38.

33 See, e. g., Federal Housing Authority et al. v. Mobile Housing Board et al.,
164 F. (2d) 146 (C. C. A. 5, 1947) where the court held that the choice of companies from whom fire insurance for federal housing units was to be purchased
rested within the discretion of the Housing Board, and was not to be interfered
with by federal courts in the absence of abuse of discretion or fraud. See also
Gross et al. v. Missouri & A. Ry. Co., 74 F. Supp 242 (W. D. Ark. 1947) holding
that the I. C. C.'s approval of the proposed abandonment of a railroad was within
the sole discretion of that commission and not judicially reviewable.
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that Congress meant to effect no change in the existing situation; nor is it likely that the federal courts will be activated
to a change of approach when reviewing administrative action precluded (expressly or impliedly) from judicial review,
or committed (expressly or impliedly) to administrative discretion. It might be, however, that in the future, as one recent case seems to demonstrate, when a court is faced with
the initial decision of whether a particular administrative
function is judicially reviewable, the Administrative Procedure Act will spur on an otherwise reluctant judge to require
more clear and convincing evidence of the congressional intent to preclude review than he might otherwise have demanded. "' Beyond that no more can be said; the prophesying of judicial interpretation of statutes is always a contingency concerning which lawyers and litigants must risk hazardous guesses."
Section 10(a): Right of Review

Any person suffering legal wrong because'of any
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
33" A district court judge has held that the Administrative Procedure Act
makes judicially reviewable the refusal of the Navy Department to pay six months
death gratuity to widow of deceased naval officer. Snyder v. Buck, 75 F. Supp
902 (App. D. C. 1948). The court reasoned that since, in its opinion, the
action sought to be reviewed was not one "committed by law to agency discretion" nor precluded from review by the basic statute (34 U. S. C. 943), it
therefore was reviewable under the A. P. Act. The Navy Department's ruling
was, in effect, a collateral attack on a prior Mexican divorce obtained by the
widow from her first husband. As such, it seems clearly to be an abuse of administrative discretion and a mistake of law. It was, therefore, reviewable by an
appropriate form of legal action. Consequently it was unnecessary for the court
to give aid and comfort to the Blachlyites by saying the Administrative Procedure
Act now "necessarily subjects to judicial review a large group of adminitrative
actions which previously could not have been re-examined or set aside by the
courts." Cf. Thomson v. United States, 58 Court of Claims 207 (1923). See also
Roberts v. United States, 176 U. S. 221, 20 S. Ct. 376, 44 L. Ed. 443 (1900).
34 Mr. Blachly is one of those worried about what he imagines to be the uncertainty which the new Act inculcates into the law. Blachly, op. cit. supra note
7, 213, 227. This writer believes that he can at least cease being apprehensive
about any alleged uncertainty inherent in the introductory provision of Section
10.
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such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.
Again, in the opinion of the writer, Congress has restated
the existing law. Others, however, are upset because of a
belief that Section 10 (a) has expanded the class of persons
who may seek and obtain judicial review of administrative
action. This latter apprehension grows out of the belief that
Congress by adding the words "aggrieved" has thus enlarged
the category to whom judicial review is available.35 The
writer hopes herein to demonstrate that such fears result
from conjured up horrors, not from dispassionate examination of the words of the provision and the legislative history
behind it.
In the first place, the provision was changed during the
course of its evolution from one in which any person "adversely affected" could seek judicial review to its present
form wherein "legal wrong" has been inserted as the general
prerequisite.36 By inserting the phrase "legal wrong," the
framers of the Act have given us a general category identifying those who are entitled to judicial review. Moving from
this general classification we encounter one sub-division
thereof embraced in the phrase "adversely affected" and another in "aggrieved." In the past, in interpreting these two
phrases the courts have held that they bar persons (1) who
bring a review proceeding prematurely (that is, before the
administrative action sought to be reviewed is of such a nature as to injure the petitioner, 7 and (2) who have not
shown an injury to a "legal interest" within the meaning of
any relevant statute.88 There is every reason to think that
Cohen, op. cit supra note 2, 323, 340.
The bill as originally introduced in the Senate read: "Any person adversely
affected by any agency action shall be entitled to judicial review thereof in accordance with this section."
35
36

37

Mass, v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 43 S. Ct. 597, 67 L. Ed. 1078 (1923);

Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U. S. 249, 50 S. Ct. 315, 74 L. Ed. 832 (1930).
38 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113, 60 S. Ct. 869, 84 L. Ed. 1108
(1940). Cf. F. C. C. v. Saunders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 60 S. Ct.
693, 84 L. Ed. 869 (1940).

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

the courts will continue so to interpret these two phrases.
The individual determinations by courts of these, phrases
have been worked out on a case by case, statute by statute
basis. The only intelligent interpretation in a particular case
will be the one which gives effect to the whole statute; one
that effects its purposes, rather than one which defeats it. 9
In such a process, the Administrative Procedure Act will
neither make nor mar.
Moreover, the cases which had highlighted the past history
of this pragmatic process had been called to the attention of
Congress by the Attorney General in conjunction with his
own opinion that Section 10 (a) merely restated the existing
law.4" Mr. Walter, Chairman of the House Sub-Committee, on the floor of the House specifically called Congress' attention to the fact that Section 10 (a) "summarized the situation as it is now generally understood." 41 These views
were not challenged during the course of the legislative history of the bill;4 2 the conclusion is inescapable that the provisions of Section 10(a) bring no change, but merely restate
the law as it stood.
If this is the case, it should set at rest the fears of the
faint hearted that Section 10(a) would permit the premature
judicial review of administrative rules of general applicability before the "legal interest" of the complainant has been
threatened by them,4" and set at ease those who imagine that,
because "any agency action" is included in Section 10(a), all
possible types of agency action, including benefactory action,
39 United States v. Public Utility Commission, 151 F. (2d) 609 (App. D.. C.
1945). See also REP. AT'Y. GEN., 83, 84-85.
40 SEw. REP., 44; SEN. Doc., 230.
41 92 Cong. Rec. 5759, (May 24, 1946).
42 For a recent Supreme Court decision in which the Court made much of
the fact that a particular construction given to a proposed act in a letter written
by the Attorney General had not been questioned during the course of legislative
history, see American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U. S. 446, 67 S. Ct. 847, 91 L. Ed.
733 (1947).
43 Shine, op. cit. supra note 9, 24; and, of course, the nervous Mr. Blachly,
op. cit. supra note 7, 226.
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are now made reviewable." However, if further proof is
needed to assuage the "doubting Thomases" it can be found
in the fact that a proposal for the judicial review of administrative rules, contained in S.674, a bill introduced into Congress in 1941 based on the recommendations of the minority
report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, had been much criticized during the 1941
hearings and as a consequence had been specifically deleted
from the 1946 Act.45 The inclusion of such a provision was
objected to because of the fear that to include it would evoke
the granting of premature review where there is no real occasion for judicial relief, since no legal interest would yet be infringed.4 6 The omission from the 1946 Act of any such provision for premature review, when taken with the requirements explicit in Section 10(a) that a petitioner must show a
"legal interest" which is being immediately jeopardized,
seem to furnish sufficient refutation to any argument that judicial review of administrative rules may be undertaken before the litigant has been specifically affected by their operation.
This conclusion seems to be substantiated by one, and possibly, two cases decided since the passage of the Act. In one,
the Supreme Court refused to grant a declaratory judgment
of a rule of specific applicability of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve system, which made as a condition
Kaufman, op. cit. supra note 2, at 500.
Hearings Before Subcommittee of the Committee On The Judidary On
S. 674 S. 675, and S. 918, 77 Cong. 1st Sess. 9, (1941), (hereinafter cited as Sen.
Hearings (1941)). Bill S. 675, modeled on the recommendations of the majority
of the Attorney General's Committee, contained no proposals concerning judicial
review in general, or declaratory judgments of administrative rule making in
particular. S. 918, a proposed bill tailored to the special minority opinions of
Chief Justice Groner, contained a provision for judicial review by declaratory
judgment of administrative rules. It was even more severely criticized during the
course of the 1941 hearings.
46 It would, as Sen. O'Mahoney pithily put it, "open the door... to fictitious
laws." Senate Hearings (1941), 195. A further apprehension voiced at the bearings was that it would tend to encourage the courts to substitute their judgment
for the agency's in determining the propriety or reasonableness of the rule. Ibid,
190.
44
45
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of membership in the Federal Reserve system for a member
bank, that it withdraw if a named corporation acquired an
interest in said bank without approval of the Board.47 The
Court found that, although the named corporation had thereafter acquired an interest in the bank without the approval
of the Board, the Board, after investigation, had formally
disavowed any intention to invoke the condition since it
found no subversion of the bank's independence. Therefore,
the Court felt that the grievance was "too remote and insubstantial, too speculative in nature" to allow review. It
would appear from this decision (although there is no mention of the Administrative Procedure Act) that the Supreme
Court will not be predisposed to grant judicial review of administrative rules unless the complainant can show that he is
a person suffering a "legal wrong." Nor does it appear likely
that the circuit courts will open the flood gates.48
It would appear then that the Attorney General was correct when he opined that Section 10 (a) merely restated the
existing law. The legislative history, ancient 49 and late 5o
support that conclusion; the only relevant Supreme Court
opinion seems to reaffirm it. The alarmists should rest easier. However, Section 10(a) illustrates quite well the danger of trying to define by general rule the class of persons
who can attack acts of administrative agencies. As the Attorney General's Committee Report pointed out, to attempt
47 Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, .... U. S .....
68 S. Ct. 641, 92
L. Ed. 592 (1948).
48 In Philadelphia Co. v. S. E. C., 164 F. (2d) 889 (App. D. C., 1947), Justice Stevens emphasized that where in its impact, a rule of the S. E. C. applied
specifically and affected the rights of a particular person or corporation, it is reviewable even if cast in general terms. This result illustrates the point that the decisive
factor -in determining whether the courts will review administrative rules is the
effect of the rule on the complaining party. If a legal interest is threatened review
will be granted; if not, it will be denied as being sought prematurely. It is not the
rule which is important, but the effect of its promulgation upon various individual
legal interests.
49 Supra notes 45 and 46.
5A See, e. g., House Hearings on H. R. 184, 339, 1117, 1202, 1206, and 2602,
79 Cong. 1st Sess. p. 30, (1945), (hereinafter cited as House Hearings (1945).
See also stepre notes 40 and 41.
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it is to do a "futile" thing, 5 in spite of the efforts of the
skittish to make it appear as a terrifying and radical change
in the law.
Section 10(b): Form of Action and Venue
The form of proceeding for judicial review shall be
any special statutory review proceeding relevant to
the subject matter in any court specified by statute
or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action (including actions for declaratory judgments or writs or prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus) in any court of
competent jurisdiction. Agency action shall be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings
for judicial enforcement except to the extent that
prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for such
review is provided by law.
Again one is encountered by a farrago of opaque statutory
gibberish which merely tells us what we knew all the time.
For instance, many regulatory statutes provide for judicial
review of agency action by requiring petitioner to file a petition for review with a circuit court of appeals (in some cases,
a district court).52 It seems self evident such statutory provisions will continue to control the required judicial review
procedure. Moreover, the Senate Committee report makes
it clear that statutes which have adopted a common law
method of review, such as a suit to enjoin under the Urgent
Deficiencies Act of 1913," a will continue unaffected.54 In adAwry. GEN. 85.
52 See, e. g., the Natural Gas Act, 52 STAT. 821 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 717;
(1940); the Federal Power Act, 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 16 U. S. C. § 791 et seq.
(1940); Securities and Exchange Act, 48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 70 (1940).
51

53

38 STAT. 220 (1913), 28 U. S. C. 47 (1940).

54 "The expression 'special statutory review' means not only special review
proceedings wholly created by statute, but so-called common-law forms referred
to and adopted by other statutes as the appropriate mode of review in given
cases", SEN. RE., 26; see also HOUSE REP., 42; SEN. Doc., 212, 276.
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dition, Congressman Walter made the point clear on the floor
of the House during debate."s
Nor does Section 10(b) affect other forms of action which
have heretofore been found by the courts to be appropriate
in particular cases. For instance, habeas corpus proceedings
shall continue to be used to obtain review of exclusion and
deportation proceedings,' and orders of the Postmaster General suspending second class mailing privileges will continue
to be tested by an injunctive suit to restrain.5" That these
types of non-statutory remedies, which the federal courts
have developed in the absence of legislation, are meant to be
preserved by the Administrative Procedure seems a fact beyond cavil, as the explanation given by the Senate Sub-committee makes clear.5"
Of course, the form of the non-statutory proceeding
must be an "applicable" form of legal action. Thus, habeas
corpus will continue to be the acceptable method to review a
deportation order,59 but certiorari could not be used since the
Supreme Court has previously decided that the writ of certiorari will not lie to review federal administrative determinations."0 Furthermore, since the non-statutory review pro55 "Mr. Walter: . . . Under this bill the technical form of proceeding for
judicial review is, first, any special proceeding which Congress has provided, or in
the absence or inadequacy thereof, any relevant form of action such as those for
declaratory judgments or injunctions in any court of competent jurisdiction." 92
Cong. Rec. 6759 (May 24, 1946).
56 U. S. ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103, 47,
S. Ct. 302, 71 L. Ed. 560 (1927).
57 Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc. 327 U. S. 146, 66 S. Ct. 456, 90 L. Ed. 586
(1946). See also a decision decided since the passage of the A. P. Act in which
the injunctive suit was used to obtain judicial review of a fraud order of the Postmaster General. Donaldson v. Read Magazine et al.. .... U .S ..... 68 S. Ct. 591;
92 L. Ed. 440 (1948).
58 "Explanation: The first sentence states the general situation, that methods
of review are 'of two kinds': (a) those contained in statutes and (b) those developed by the courts in absence of legislation." Sm. Comm. Pimnr, 25; Sm. Doc.
36.
59 U. S. ex rel. Lindenau v. Watkins, 73 F. Supp. 216, 219 (S. D. N. Y.,
1947). Noted 23 Nomn DAI&E LAWYE 253.
09 Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U. S. 162, 33 S. Ct. 639, 57 L. Ed. 1135 (1913).
This is some evidence to the contrary contained in a discussion on the floor between Sen. McCarran and Sen. Austin. See 92 .Cong. Rec. 2200-2201 (May 13,
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ceedings are to be available only where the special statutory
method is inadequate, a question arises as to what "inadequate" means. The Act does not define it. However, an appraisal of the legislative history -of the provision makes manifest the conclusion that Congress meant to leave to the
courts as hithertofore, the determination of whether or not
a particular statutory review proceeding is legally ade8
quate.1
The conclusion here reached on this question has been
squarely reiterated in a recent federal district court decision.
In United States v. Watkins,62 the court held, in a review upon a habeas corpus proceeding of a deportation order issued
by the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization,
that "the Administrative Procedure Act does not in any way
modify the existing forms of proceedings to review final actions of administrative agencies, nor does it create new remedies if an adequate remedy is in existence." It appears obvious that the courts will continue to tolerate non-statutory
methods of review when, in their opinion, the situation calls
for judicial relief. Such a process is old stuff to them; it
took no Administrative Procedure Act to galvanize them into
action on that front.6"
In regard to the venue provision of Section 10(b) it is
equally evident that Congress wished to leave existing venue
provisions undisturbed. The Act specifically says that re1946). However, it seems that Sen. McCarran overlooked the Degge case when
he informed Sen. Austin that certiorari might be available to review federal administrative action. At least one other writer agrees with this observation. Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 4, at 572.
61 ". . . if the procedure is inadequate (i. e., where under existing law a court
would regard the special statutory procedure as inadequate and would grant another form of relief), then any applicable procedure, such as prohibitory or mandatory injunction, declaratory judgment, or habeas corpus is available." Appendix to Attorney General's Letter, SEN. REP., 44; Sar. Doe. 230. Note also that
certiorari is not listed in the category of applicable form of relief.
62 Op. cit. supra note 59.
63 For a recent example of this traditional phenomenon see United States v.
Wheeling Downs, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 882 (N. D. W. Va. 1947) where the court
granted equity review of an order of the housing expediter in spite of the fact
that the statute under which review was originally sought had been repealed.
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view shall take place in "any court specified by statute" or
"in any court of jurisdiction." But just to insure that this
time "words mean what they say they mean" the House
Committee report states that no change was intended.64
The last sentence of Section 10(b) provides that "agency
action shall be subject to judicial review in criminal or civil
proceedings for judicial enforcement except to the extent
that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for such review is provided by law." The question immediately arises,
does this mean that agency action can be collaterally attacked in civil or criminal proceedings in all cases except where a
statute has prescribed the exclusive form of review? The
answer to this seems clear enough to be "no". The Committee
reports make it certain that the provision is only operative
"where statutes, either expressly or as they are interpyeted"
require some prior, adequate, and exclusive form of judicial
review.6" (Italics supplied). This objective was accomplished by expanding the phrase "provided by statute" to its present form, "provided by law." 66 Thus, situations where the
court has concluded from an appraisal of the statutory context that it was the congressional intention to provide for an
exclusive method of judicial review, even though they didn't
expressly say so in the statute, are preserved.Y" - Therefore,
the courts will continue to determine for themselves whether
64 "The section does not alter review provisions under existing law, whether
in connection with specially provided statutory review or the so called nonstatutory
or common-law action variety." House REP., 42; SEN. Doc., 276. See also Mr.
Walter's explanation of the provisions on the House floor. 92 Cong. Rec., 5654
(May 24, 1946).
65 SEx. REP. 27; HousE REP. 42; SE. Doc., 2.13, 276.
66 SE. Comm. PPNmT, p.18; SE. Doc., p.37.
67 See, e.g., United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U. S. 287, 67 S.Ct. 207, 91 L.Ed.
229 (1946), where the Supreme Court concluded that under the Agricultural Market Agreement Act Congress had evidenced an intention to withhold review in an
enforcement proceeding; the proper recourse was to the administrative remedy provided by statute. See also United States v. Turner Dairy, 166 F.(2d) 1 (C.CA.. 7th,
1948) ; Walling v. Cohen, 48 F. Supp. 859 (E. D. Pa. 1943), affirmed in 140 F. (2d)
453, dealing with Fair Labor Standards Act; and Piuma v. United States, 126
F. (2d) 601, (C.C.A. 9th, 1942), cert. den., 317 U.S. 637, 63 S. Ct. 28, 87 L. Ed. 513
(1942) dealing with the Federal Trade Commission Act.
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the alleged invalidity of agency action can be set up as a defense in criminal or civil enforcement proceedings, or, on the
other hand, whether such collateral attack is barred in a
particular case because Congress has provided that the exclusive road to judicial review is by first exhausting the administrative procedure available."8
In other words, the "i. p. j" (initial primary jurisdiction)
doctrine is preserved and, for example, the alleged unreasonableness of rates or tariffs must still first be tested before
the administrative agency concerned before an enforcement
court will assume jurisdiction of the matter.6 9
Once again, in Section 10(b) we see the legislative draftsmen telling us in the peculiar language of their cult that
which we already know. This is not to deprecate the efforts
of Congress to fashion in statutory jargon what was already
quite clearly understood by those lawyers who took the time
to study the availability of judicial review of administrative
action; but it must be admitted that up to this point the provisions of Section 10 seem to be vox et praetereanihil.
Section 10(c): Reviewable Acts
Every agency action made reviewable by statute and
every final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in any court shall be subject to
judicial review. Any preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable shall be subject to review upon review of the
final agency action. Except as otherwise expressly
required by statute, agency action otherwise final
shall be final for the purpose of this subsection
whether or not there has been presented or deter68 "The second sentence states the present rule as to enforcement proceedings." SEN. Comm. PRnNT, 18; SEN. Doe., 37.
69 Ambassador, Inc. v. United States, 325 U.S. 317, 65 S.Ct. 1151, 89 L.Ed.
1637 (1945).
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mined any application for a declaratory order, for any
form of reconsideration, or (unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action
meanwhile shall be inoperative) -for an appeal to superior agency authority.
Indeed, Section 10 (c) reads like a product of a semantic
Alice-in-Wonderland world populated by legislative draftsmen and German philosophers. What does this unintelligible hodgepodge mean? From the point of view of change
in the law, let it be said that it means little, if anything.
First, it is clear that the words "every agency action made
reviewable by statute" insure that where statutes. specifically
provide for judicial review of agency action, such action will
thus continue so to be reviewed. More problematical is the
meaning and effect of the phrase which requires review of
"every final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in any court." It seems plausible that this
section is to be construed in the light of other statutory and
case law and must be read in conjunction with the two general exceptions to Section 10, with the provisions of 10(a)
governing the category of persons who have a right of review, and with the provisions of 10 (b) respecting review actions. It should be emphasized that the Administrative Procedure Act can only be correctly understood when interpreted as a whole, as a complete entity composed of inter-related
parts. Those who insist upon proceeding upon a compartmentalized basis do the framers of the Act a great disservice."° With this in mind it is clear that, if administrative action is committed to agency discretion, or is precluded from
review (expressly or impliedly) by the basic statute, or is
70 "The bill is so drafted that its several sections and subordinate provisions
are closely knit. HOUSE REP., 17; SEN. Doc., 251. "Mr. McCarran: . .. Perhaps it
might be well at this time to emphasize that this bill is a coherent whole; no section or paragraph is independent; all parts of it are closely interrelated. The bill
must be read and considered as a whole, and in this case the whole is considerably
more than the sum of all its parts." 92 Cong. Rec. 2192 (March 12, 1946).
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challenged by a person who has no legal interest in the matter,-Section 10(c) can not be relied on to remedy the particular disqualification for judicial review.
With this method of approach as a guidepost, the provisions of Section 10 (c) begin to make more sense and to reveal no persuasive evidence that the section embodies any
change in the law. For example, the phrase "final agency action" can thus be unraveled. While the act does not provide
us with a definition of final, it is obvious that it is used in contrast with "preliminary, procedural, or intermediate" agency
actions as those terms are used in Section 10(c). Furthermore, previous cases involving the interpretation of "final"
administrative action are not unknown.7 ' "Agency action" is,
however, defined in 2 (g) of the Act to include "rule, order,
license, sanction, relief * * * (and) failure to act." This does
not mean, therefore, that every administrative action, such
as a rule of general applicability, would be made reviewable
under the terms of Section 10 (c). In such a case, as previously pointed out, we would first have to consider the
applicability of Section 10(a) which deals with the right of
review.72
Moreover, assuming that the action is challenged by a person whose legal interests have been, or are about to be, violated, we still must consider whether, in the words of Section
10(c), "there is no other adequate remedy in any court." In
a recent federal circuit court decision, it has been held that a
deportation order of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization was reviewable under Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.7" The district court had pre71
See, e.g., Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 59
S. Ct. 754, 83 L.Ed. 1147 (1939).
72 See supra p ...... See also the recent case of Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731,
67 S. Ct. 1001, 91 L. Ed. 903 (1947), in which petitioner by reading 2(g) of the
Act together with 10(c), attempted to argue that the Administrative Procedure
Act indicated an intention to make the United States suable for the purpose of
recovering collateral bonds from the United States Maritime Commission. The
court left the point unanswered in its decision.
73 United States ex rel. Trinler v. Carusi, 166 F. (2d) 457 (C.C.A. 3rd. 1948).
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viously ruled that a proceeding other than habeas corpus was
not, despite the Administrative Procedure Act, the proper
form of action to restrain deportation. 4 The decision of the
circuit court might be questioned on the grounds that the
"applicable" form of review should have been by habeas
corpus. However, since the petitioner had exhausted all his
administrative remedies before the Board, even though he
had not yet been taken into custody, it would be a harsh

thing to argue that habeas corpus was the "exclusive" remedy by which he must proceed. In other words, there existed a gap between the exhausting of one's tefnedies before
the Board, and the act of being taken into custody. This
gap is now closed by the terms of Section 10(c). The decision
is in line with the extra and proper solicitude with which the
present Supreme Court surveys threatened injury to personal
liberty. 75 The Administrative Procedure Act may make that
judicial philosophy more easy to rationalize henceforth. It

should work no great change in the large sphere which lies
outside of the right to personal liberty. 6
The second sentence of Section 10 (c) makes any "preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action not directly
72 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Pa., 1947).
The Supreme Court has construed section 11 of the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940 (50 U.S.C. App. 311) to allow a defendant, indicted for a
violation of the Act, to attack a local board's induction order, even though section
10(a) (2) of that Act states that the . . . "decisions of such local boards shall be
final" except for- certain appeal purposes. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114.
66 S.Ct., 423, 90 L.Ed. 567 (1946). The Court had previously ruled. in a similar
case that a defendant who refused to report for induction could not collaterally
attack a draft board classification by way of a defense to a criminal prosecution
for failure to report for induction. Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 64 S.Ct.
346, 88 L.Ed. 305 (1944). In the Estep case, defendant had r.ported for induc-'
tion but refused to submit to induction. In the Falbo case defendant did not proceed this far. He did not "exhaust his administrative remedies."
74
75

76 The present Supreme Court sometimes seems to become more demanding
in its application of the "substantial evidence" rule when dealing with a personal
liberty case. See Bridges v. Wixon (deportation proceeding), 326 U.S. 135, 178, 65
S.Ct. 1443, 89 L.Ed. 2103 (1945). While the writer is :n hearty agreement with
such cautious and high regard for the protection of pe.sona! liberty, he is also
aware that decisions such as the Trinter, Estep and Bridges cases are not able to
be relied too heavily on as precedents in other situations not concerned with a
threat to a personal right of freedom, liberty, etc.
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reviewable" able to be reviewed upon review of the final
agency action. This is made clear by legislative history of the
section to the effect that there was no "intention to make reviewable preliminary or procedural orders where there is a
subsequent and adequate remedy at law available, as is presently the rule." 11
Such a rule had been firmly settled on the strength of
many decisions." At least one decision subsequent to the
passage of the Act which has treated the question manifests
no judicial inclination to reverse the previous attitude of
courts in the matter. In this decision, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals denied a petition for review of an order of
the S. E. C. disallowing motion for change of site of a Commission hearing on the rationale that under Section 10(c) of
the Administrative Procedure Act preliminary or procedural
orders of an administrative body are not subject to a review.

79

One final inquiry about Section 10 (c) might be the question
of whether or not that section in any way overturns the doctrine of "exhaustion" of administrative remedies? Extracts
from both the House and Senate Committee reports indicate
it was not the congressional purport to change the existing
rule along these lines."0 Section 10 (c) provides that where
the basic statute expressly requires that an application for
rehearing be resorted to as a prerequisite for judicial review,
such a procedure will continue unimpaired. There is at least
one statute which might be affected by Section 10 (c), howSFN. CoMM. PRMT. 19; SEN. Doc. 37.
78 A recent Supreme Court decision illustrating the point is Fed. Power
Comm. v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 330 U.S. 802, 67 S.Ct. 962, 91 L.Ed. 785
(1947).
79 Eastern Utilities Associates v. S.E.C., 162 F. (2d) 385, 387 (C.C.A. 2nd.
1947). An argument unsuccessfully was made to the effect that section 5(a) of the
Administrative Procedure Act requires the Commission to give "due regard for the
convenience and necessity of the parties" in arranging hearings; hence, the interlocutory order of the Commission should be reviewed on the grounds that it had
failed in this regard.
80 HousE REP. 43, 55; SEN. Doc. 277, 289.
77.
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ever section 1006(d) of the Civil Aeronautics Act does not
specifically mention petitions for rehearing or reconsideration
but has been judicially interpreted as requiring a rehearing
petition as a prerequisite for review.81 Since the parent statute does not "expressly require" a petition for reconsideration, it is now quite possible that petitioners proceeding under
the Civil Aeronautics Act can now omit this intermediate
step. (Italics supplied). However, it seems clear that, under
the many statutes (including Section 1006 (d) of the Civil
Aeronautics Act) which provide that no objection to agency
action not urged before the agency action shall be considered
by the courts, the wisest course will be first to seek agency reconsideration with all objections fully set forth. Otherwise,
since many objections to the agency action obviously cannot
be intelligently formulated until the agency has handed down
its decision, petitioners might be rebuffed by the courts on the
grounds that their request for judicial review was premature.
Finally, where the parent statute merely confers a right upon
the parties to apply for a rehearing and does not make it
their express duty, Section 10(c) now makes such an application unnecessary.
The last sentence of Section 10 (c) allows the administrative agencies to require by rule that agency reconsideration
must be sought as a prerequisite for judicial review. Thus,
while under Section 8 (a) of the Administrative Procedure
Act the initial decision of the hearing officer may become the
final decision of the agency in absence of an appeal therefore,
the agency can, under Section 10 (c), require by rule that the
initial decisions first be appealed to the top agency authority
before judicial review can be sought.83 However, Section
10(c) does specifically require that agency action be made in81

Braniff Airways, Inc. v. C.A.B., 147 F.(2d) 152 (App. D.C. 1945).
Levers v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 219, 223, 66 S.Ct. 72, 90 L.Ed. 26 (1945).
83 SEN. REP. 27; HOUSE REP. 43, 55; SEN. Doc. 213, 277, 289. See, e.g., Rule
30, GENERAL RULES or PRACTicE AND PROCEDURE Or rn
Faomm
Powaa CoxMissioN, 179, F.P.C. A-27).
82
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operative pending any such appeals, since otherwise the effect
of any agency rule o reconsideration would be to subject the
party "to the agency action and to repetitious administrative
process without recourse." 84 This does not mean that the
agency must take positive action for the benefit of a complaining party. Thus, where an agency requires by its rule
that the denial of the issuance of a license be appealed to it,
the license would not have first to be granted in order to require a request for rehearing as a prerequisite to judicial review."
At least one recent case adopts the view that Section 10(c)
is merely declaratory of existing law.'
The court held that
an administrative action held by the N. L. R. B., under procedures not published as required by 3 (e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, is unlawful but is not reviewable under
the Act. Since, in the N. L. R. B. cases, even after a hearing
has been held and an order issued, there is no effective
agency action until the Board secures an enforcement order
from the court, it is clear that the request for review here was
premature. In other words, it was intermediate agency action which could be reviewed only upon review of the final
agency order by the court to whom application was made
for an enforcement order. The decision is an excellent example of a court which properly looked to the Act as an entirety and was not misled by isolated sections or phrases.8 7
Courts using this approach to the problem of interpreting the
Administrative Procedure Act will agree with Congressman
Walter's remark that Section 10(c) involves "no departure
from the usual and well understood rules of procedure in this
field." "
84

SEN. RaP. 27; SEN. DoC. 213.

85 Ibid. The provision is aimed at preserving the status quo, not at compelling affirmative agency action.
86

Olin Industries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 72 F. Supp. 225 (D. Mass. 1947).

87 Contrast this approach with the opinion in Snyder v. Buck, op. cit. supra
note 33a.
88 CONG. R .c, May 24, 1946, 5654; See also SEN. REP., 44; SEN. Doc. 230.
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Section 10(d): Interim Relief
Pending judicial review an agency is authorized
where it finds that justice so requires, to postpone the
effective date of any action taken by it. Upon such
conditions as may be required and to the extent necessary to prevent -irreparable injury, every reviewing
court (including every court to which a case may be
taken on appeal from or upon application for certiorari or other writ to a reviewing court) is authorized to issue all necessary and appropriate process to
postpone the effective date of any agency action or to
preserve the status or rights pending conclusion of the
review proceedings.
The first sentence merely embraces a well accepted discretionary practice of administrative agencies to stay operative effect of its own action in certain cases. It is once again
a restatement of the existing law, only in this case it is statutory, recognition of an administrative practice rather than
a judicial one.
The second sentence takes up the power of reviewing
courts to grant stay orders postponing the operative effect
of administrative action. This power the courts have always possessed as a necessary adjunct in making their power
of judicial review effective.8" For instance, the court of appeals has made a practice for many years of granting stay
orders in attempts to preserve the status quo while it reviews decisions of the Federal Communications Commission.
While Section 10(d) would not allow the court of appeals, by
exercising its stay power, to compel issuance of an initial license, it seems that the court may now, by issuance of a stay
order, keep an existing station in operation until the appeal
is determined.9"
89 SEN. REP. 27; HousE. RP. 43; SEa. Doc. 213, 277. By the same token, interim payments of benefits could not be ordered by the court.
90 To this extent any language to the contrary found in the Scripps Howard
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Nevertheless, the Act manifests clearly the intention that
the stay power should only be exercised when necessary to
prevent irreparable injury. It is not to be granted automatically but only if the equities of the situation so dictate.9
It must be admitted that there is some language in the House
report which, if taken at face value, would indicate a congressional wish that courts extend rights of parties pending
judicial review and to that extent diminish the exclusiveness
of a particular administrative remedy.92 There may be
some who like Professor Cohen, believe that the decks are
now cleared for judicial tyranny and the "immobilization of
administrative action by the use of the restraining order or
temporary injunction".93 This writer prefers to accept the
reassuring explanation which Chairman Walter gave on the
floor of the House that the "operation (of Section 10(d) will
involve no radical departures from what has generally been
regarded as an essential and inherent right of the
courts... .".9 This conclusion is further strengthened by re-

calling that the particular sentence in Section 10 (d) dealing
with the problem has received a curtailed phraseology from
that which it originally possessed.95 As the section reads now
it would seem that courts are not to grant a stay order for the
mere maintenance of the status quo. Therefore, Section
10(d) appears to reaffirm the judicial attitude, expressed by
the Supreme Court in the Yakus case, that the "award of an
Radio opinion would be overruled. Scripps Howard Radio Inc. v. F.C.C., 316 U.S.
4, 14, 62 S.Ct. 875, 86 L.Ed. 1229 (1942).
91 HousE REP,. p. 43; SEN. Doc. p. 277.
92 ". . . statutes authorizing agency action are to be constued to extend
rights pending judicial review and the exclusiveness of the administrative remedy
is diminished as far as this section operates . . ." House Rep., 43; Sen. Doc., 277.
Naturally, this language furnishes Mr. Blachiy an opportunity for indulging in

some grand in terrorem arguments. op. it. supra ncte 7. p.4 2 2 . Professor Cohen
(op. cit. supra note 2, p. 340) and Mr. Shine (op. cit. supra note 9, 27) seem to
share these apprehension.
93
94

Cohen, op. dt. supra note 2, 340.
92 Cong Rec. 5659 (May 24, 1946).

95 As originally introduced the section read: "to the extent necessary to preserve status or rights, afford an opportunity for judicial re.:iew of any question of

law, or prevent irreparable injury." (Italics supplied).
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interlocutory injunction.., has never been regarded as strictly a matter of right" but will issue only after proper judicial
evaluation of the public interests and private rights involved,
and the evidence of the congressional desire in the matter. 6
At any rate, two decisions decided since the passage of the
Act reveal no tendency on the part of the courts to depart
from an attitude of forbearance to interfere with the operative effect of administrative action, by promiscuous use of
their power to stay. In an action against a market administrator, under the Agricultural Market Agreement Act, for a
preliminary injunction pending disposition of statutory review proceedings before the Secretary of Agriculture, Section
10(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act was relied on before a "potential" reviewing court (which would have jurisdiction if the pending proceedings before the Secretary should
turn out adversely to the complainant). The court refused to
grant the injunction sought and made it clear that the stay
power, if exercised at all, could only be exercised upon the
final adverse determination of the Secretary of Agriculture. 7
The point is, that "pending conclusion of review proceedings"
refers to court proceedings, and not administrative proceedings.
Again, another federal court has held that the fact that
veterans employed in the Civil Service at a Boston shipyard
who were demoted would suffer immediate inconvenience of
loss of pay and prestige, would not constitute irreparable injury warranting injunction relief under Section 10(d) of the
Administrative Procedure Act pending final decision by the
Civil Service Commission. 8
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944).
97 Avon Dairy v. Eisaman, 69 F. Supp. 500 (D.C. Ohio, 1946). The case also
illustrates the requirement that, under 10(d), the phrase "reviewing court" tefers
only to a court which has, or will have, jurisdiction to review the final agency
action. It is not equivalent to "any reviewing court" (Italics supplied). See Attorney General's Manual, op. cit. supra note 6, at 106-107.
98 Wettre v. Hague, 74 F. Supp. 396, 401 (D. Mass. 1947).
96
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Section 10(e): Scope of Review
So far as necessary to decision and where presented
the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions
of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of
the terms of any agency action. It shall (a) compel
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed; and (b) hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1)
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3)
in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of procedure required by law; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence in any case subject to
the requirements of sections 7 and 8 or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided
by statute; or (6) unwarranted by the facts to the
extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by
the reviewing court. In making the foregoing determinations the court shall review the whole record or
such portions thereof as may be cited by any party,
and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
As an example of the prolixity of legislative draftsmen
Section 10(e) is hard to best. Consequently, it is not strange
to discover that it is Section 10(e) about which there is, perhaps, more disagreement over its intended effect than any
other section of the Administrative Procedure Act.9" This
writer's personal view is that no fundamental change was intended as to the scope of judicial review; nor is it likely that
99 "This 10(e) restates the present law as to the scope of judicial review."
A1'roRNEY G
aE's MAuAL, op. cit. supra note 6, 108. On the other hand,
Professor Dickinson contends that 10(e) broadens the scope of judicial review of
fact and law. Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 4, at 578 et. seq.
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the courts will construe Section 10 (e) as to effect any major
change in that regard.
The first sentence would appear to be quite simply a restatement of the present powers which reviewing courts possess, and frequently exercise, of reviewing relevant questions
of constitutional and statutory law, including whether the
factors upon which the administrative decision was based
were such as the agency was permitted to consider."' There
is at least one respectable authority who argues that a change
of a fundamental nature is embraced in that seemingly harmless first sentence. Professor Dickinson has contended with
some. force that, since Section 10 (e) places the imperative
duty upon the reviewing court to determine "the meaning or
applicability" of agency action, courts now must broaden
their scope of review of questions of law in cases where the
questions of law involve the construction of technical terms
and the application of knowledge expert and specialized in
character. 1 ' In other words, "mixed" questions of law and
fact must now be reviewed de novo by the courts. Professor
Dickinson selects as his prime example of the phenomenon referred to the Dobson decision," ° a tax case, wherein the Supreme Court refused to substitute their own judgment for
that of the Tax Court, which previously had found a particular transaction resulted in either a capital gain or a return
on capital but not an ordinary gain. In that decision, the
Supreme Court gave persuasive indication that, when dealing
with a situation where it "cannot separate the elements of a
decision so as to identify a clear cut mistake of law," it would
not treat the administrative decision as one of "law". 0 3 In
other words, the Court will respect the finding of the administrative agencies in the hazy enclave of "mixed questions of
law and fact" land in the same manner as they do in the more
106 RFP. AT'Y. GEN. 88.
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Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 4, at 582-585.
Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239, 88 L.Ed. 248 (1943).
Id. at 520.
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distinctly outlined sphere of a "pure" question of fact. It
is not the purpose of this article to rehash the whole problem
of mixed questions of law and fact; enough has been said on
the point! 104 This writer's only concern is to ascertain what
happens to the approach of the Supreme Court (as exemplified in the Dobson case) under Section 10(e).
In this respect, the writer must join Mr. Shine 105 in his
disagreement with the conclusion of Professor Dickinson on
the point. In the first place, Professor Dickinson, who argues
that the words of Section 10(e) change the rule of the Dobson case, ignores the general exception to Section 10 in the
form of matters "by law committed to agency discretion."
The Dobson case and subsequent Supreme Court decisions
dealing with decisions of the Tax Court have it apparent that,
in regard to questions which are not "clear cut" questions of
law, their defermination will reside exclusively in the discretion of the Tax Court. It is true that in the cases subsequent to the Dobson case the Supreme Court has shown a
tendency to limit this category of administrative exclusive0 6 Nevertheless, the rule
ness as the part of the Tax Court."
of the Dobson case had been a subject of extensive comment
in legal circles at the time of the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act. The congressional silence"
on the
subject, plus the agency discretion exception, at least are
equal to the only evidence which Professor Dickinson is able
to marshall, i. e., the words of a single phrase in Section
10(e).
104 See, e.g., Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators,Judges, and Juries:
A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARVARD L. REV. 70, (1944), Paul, Dolson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 753 (1944); and a
host of others.
105 Shine, op. cit. supra note 9, at 30.
106 Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 65 S.Ct. 1232, 89 L.Ed.
1670 (1945); Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 66 S.Ct. 546, 90 L.Ed. 752
(1946); Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 1047, 91 L.Ed. 931 (1947).
1o7
When it suits his purpose Professor Dickinson makes much of congressional silence on a point. See Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 4, at 585, fn 55.
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Moreover, the Attorney's Committee on Administrative
Procedure had pointed up the great difficulty in drawing any
clear cut line of cleavage between questions of law and questions of fact.108 It is highly unlikely that so debatable and
complex a concept was meant to be resolved by Congress
through the use of an isolated phrase which could be interpreted in one of several ways, and for whose alleged intended
effect, not one iota of evidence can be found in the Committee reports or in the debates on the floor of either House or
Senate. Indeed, Carl McFarland, a member of the Attorney
General's Committee and prime mover in the important task
of guiding the present Act through its legislative evolution
has specifically ventured the opinion that Congress did not
mean to affect the rule of the Dobson case.'0 9 It may be presumptious, but the implication from Mr. McFarland's remark in this regard would seem to indicate that he is of the
same opinion as this writer. Namely, the whole problem of
"mixed" questions of law and fact is merely another ramification of the substantial evidence rule. If the administrative
determination is based on substantial evidence, i. e., a conclusion that a reasonable person could have reached in view
of both the facts and the law, then the court. should not disturb it, even though it might have reached a different conclusion."' Therefore, if (as will be attempted to be proved
infra) the Administrative Procedure Act wrought no change
108 REP. ATT'Y. Gar., p. 88. Interestingly enough, the Committee there cites
-Professor Dickinson himself: "Matters of law grow downward into roots of fact,
and matters of fact reach upward into roots of law.... It would seem that when
the courts are unwilling to reviewi they are tempted to explain by the easy device
of calling the question one of 'fact'; and when otherwise disposed, they say it is a
question of 'law'." DIcnIusoN, A
LAW 55 (1927).

rnrmTrAT JusrxcE AND T=E SuREmAcy oF

10V "Question: I wonder if Mr. McFarland would care to comment on the
effect of the use of the word 'substantial" in the statute in connection with the
evidence upon which judicial review is based.... as to whether he thinks the Dobson rule is affected by the statute? Mr. McFarland: I can answer the question
very simply by saying no." op. cit. supra note 4, p. 69. See also Mr. McFarland's
testimony before the House Subcommittee, House Hearings. (1945) 37; Sm. Doc.
83.
L1,0 See Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412, 62 S.Ct. 326, 86 L.Ed. 301 (1941).
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in the substantial evidence rule, by the same token, it effected
no alteration of the Dobson rule as applied to "mixed" questions of law and fact.
Moreover, recent cases decided by the Supreme Court reveal no indication on the part of that body of jurists of a
change of attitude or approach toward review of "mixed"
questions of law and fact. If anything, decisions subsequent
to the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act manifest
a greater resolve on the part of the court to disdain the conceptualistic formula as a solution to the mysteries of law and
fact, and, instead, to embrace more firmly a pragmatic, case
by case, modus operandi, with special stress on the special
and particular expertise (real or alleged) of administrative
tribunals."'
In a case decided soon after the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, Unemployment Compensation Commission of Alaska v. Aragon," 2 the Supreme Court upheld a
finding by the Alaska Commission that certain unemployment insurance benefits properly were denied applicants because their employment was "due to a labor dispute which
is in active progress," which constituted disqualification for
benefits under the statute. In upholding the Commission's
construction of this phrase, the court, in so many words, applied the substantial evidence rule. Again in N. L. R. B. v.
Atkins 13 a case which involved an interpretation of the term
"employee" under the National Labor Relations Act as applied to certain guards of a plant engaged in war production
required by law to be auxiliaries to the military police of
the United States Army, the Court upheld the Board's initial
determination. In his majority opinion Justice Murphy
1,11 A brief but excellent discussion of the Supreme Court's progress away
from the approach of the logician to that of the pragmatist is contained in Carrow,
Background of Administrative Law, p. 68 et seq. (1948).
11,2 Unemployment Compensation Com'n v. Aragan, 329 U.S. 143, 67 S.Ct.
245, 91 L.Ed. 143 (1946).
Al. N.L.R.B. v. Atkins & Co. 331 U.S. 398, 67 S.Ct. 1265, g1 L.Ed. 1157
(1947).
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made it clear that the administrative tribunal to whom Congress had entrusted the administration of statutes involving
the most complex economic and social relationships was not
restricted to traditional legal concepts of "employee" and
"employer", but was free to take into account the more relevant economic and statutory considerations in arriving at its
decision. Such a decision would not lightly be set aside by
the court.'14
The latest manifestation of the Court's abjuration of abstractionism occurs in S. E. C. v. Chenery, "I wherein the
majority sustained a denial by the Commission of a proposed
amendment to a reorganization plan whereby preferred stock
purchased by management during the reorganization of a
holding company would be treated on a parity with other
preferred stock. The record showed neither fraud nor any
general commission, rule or regulation governing in any way
this type of management trading during reorganization. In
short, the problem was res nova. However, the majority felt
that retroactivity was no bar in the case; that the Commission had rested its decision on the particular facts of the case,
its general experience in reorganization matters, and its informed view of statutory requirements that such reorganizations must be in the public interest. In such a situation, the
scope of the administrative order was limited to an application of the substantial evidence rule.
While this last case was also the occasion for a polemical
dissent by Justice Jackson in which Justice Frankfurter
joined," and while none of the other cases mentioned here
referred to Section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure
N.L.R.B. v. Atkins & Co., 67 S.Ct. 1265, 1268-1269.
115 332 U.S. 194, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1429 (1947). Noted in 1 VAwDmER-T
L. R. 118 (1947).
116 Justice Jackson castigated the majority opinion as sanctioning "conscious
lawlessness." 332 U.S. 194, 67 S.Ct. 1760, 92 L.Ed. 1 (1947). Justice Jackson did
not file his dissenting opinion till the beginning of the new term after probably
having spent the intervening months sizzling with anger and the anticipation of
offering hot rejoinder.
114
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Act, they certainly cannot be dismissed lightly. They furnish strong corroboration for the view that the spectre of
"mixed" questions of law and fact has finally been completely obliterated by a few well delivered blows with the "substantial evidence" poker. It seems highly unlikely that a
vague phrase in the Administrative Procedure Act will resurrect that apparition from the purgatory of outmoded jurisprudential concepts.
Clause A of Section 10(e) has also been the occasion for
uneasiness on the part of some observers. 1 17 However, the
salient legislative history of the phrase which authorizes a reviewing court to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld
or unreasonably delayed" should dispel any doubts on the
score. It is no more than a particularized restatement of the
existing judicial practice under the Judicial Code." 8 Specific
statutory consent was not necessary to give the federal courts
this power. For example, the District of Columbia courts
have a recognized jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to
administrative agencies." 9 Nevertheless, the power is one
the courts have exercised with the greatest of restrained discretion. It is to be expected that they will continue to demonstrate caution in the administration of this power since its
proper exercise is one which must, as Professor Nathanson
has pointed out, weigh important considerations of dispatch
in the conduct of public business against equally heavy considerations of public interest. 2 '
111

Cohen, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 340.
COaMM. PRINT. 20; Sm".
Doe. 39; House Hearings (1945). 37;
SEN. Doc. 83; Si-e. R '. 38, 43, 44; SENe. Doe. 224, 229, 230.
119 Safeway Stores, Inc., v. Brown, 138 F.(2d) 278 (E.C.A., 1943), cert. den.
320 U.S. 797, 64 S.Ct. 266, 88 L.Ed. 480 (1943). See also I.C.C. v. United States
ex rel. Humboldt Steamship Co., 224 U.S. 474, 32 S.Ct. 556, 56 L.Ed. 849 (1912).
120 Nathanson, op. cit. supra note 2, p.418. Some of the factors which Professor Nathanson cites to illustrate the difficulty of choice in a particular instance
are (1) a short-handed staff who must decide between matters of equal importance, (2) a choice between an ill-informed decision and a more thorough examination, (3) a change in staff necessitating the allowance of an opportunity of
new officials to familiarize themselves with old problems. These and other factors
make any selection of action in particular cases a function better reposed in administrative officials close to the scene than in any reviewing court.
18)

Sss'.
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Moreover, it seems certain that clause (A) does not empower a court to substitute its discretion for that of an administrative agency. For a court to do that would be to exercise administrative duties, and in the case of constitutional
courts would be a violation of the separation of powers
principle which has been firmly enunciated in prior cases.' 21
As a final word, it should be pointed out that clause (A)
grants the power to compel action to "the reviewing court"
and thus would appear to limit it to the court which has, or
1 22
eventually will have jurisdiction.
Coming to an appraisal of what possible changes in the
scope of judicial review, if any, may be effected by the numbered clauses of Section 10(e) (B) there is presented little
doubt as to congressional intention, except for clauses (5)
and (6). It should be made clear, however, that clause (1)
which places upon the reviewing court the duty of setting
aside agency action which is, among other possibilities,
"otherwise not in accordance with law," requires that all of
the procedures made mandatory by the twelve sections of the
Administrative Procedure Act be observed by administrative
tribunals. It may be, as at least one writer fears, 2 ' that reviewing courts will be besieged with objections to administrative procedural sins. If that hazard exists, it does so, not because of any restrictive changes imposed by Section 10, but
because broader procedural requirements have now been
statutorily imposed. To this writer, it seems that statutory
certainty, which lays down the requirements of minimum
fair administrative procedure, is much to be preferred by
parties, agencies, and courts, than to continue an illusive
12:1 Fed. Radio Commission v. General Electric, 281 U.S. 464, 60 S.Ct. 389,
74 L.Ed. 969 (1930); Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693,
47 S.Ct. 284, 71 L.Ed. 478 (1927); Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261
U.S. 428, 43 S.Ct. 449, 67 L.Ed. 731 (1923). See Sr. REP. 44; Sm. Doe. p.230.
122 Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n., 319 U.S. 21, 63 S.Ct. 938, 87 L.Ed.
1185 (1943).
123 See, e. g., GELLEoRN, ADixansmATrrE LAW: CASES AN Comrmrs 715724 (2d ed. 1947).
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struggle with the vague "due process" objection in the search
for legality of administrative proceedings. We all can recall
the endless series of Morgan cases; we all should be thankful
that the Act implements judicial subjectivity with some legislative objectivity.'
It might be noted that in at least two recent cases in which
the failure to observe the procedural requisites of the Administrative Procedure Act (apart from those imposed on
the courts by Section 10) has been alleged as grounds for
reversal of the administrative decision, the reviewing court
has rejected the contention.'2 5
The most important, and perhaps the widest disagreement
about Section 10(e) is found in the dispute among courts and
commentators as to its alleged effect upon the substantial evidence rule. Clause (5) requires a reviewing court to set
aside an administrative determination where it is "unsupported by substantial evidence in any case subject to the
requirements of sections 7 and 8 1" or otherwise reviewed on
the record of an agency hearing provided by statute." In
making administrative determinations "the court shall review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be
cited by any party * * *." Professor Cohen fears,'27 and
Professor Dickinson is certain,' 2 8 that the net effect of all
this is to change or modify the substantial evidence rule.
Professor Dickinson rests his argument on the grounds that
some previous decisions had revealed a tendency for the Supreme Court to uphold administrative determination if supported by a "scintilla" of evidence; 129 that such judicial
obliquity had been called to the attention of Congress during
124 Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Anderson, 75 F. Supp. 363, 368 (D. Kan., 1947);
Olin Industries v. N.L.R.B., op. cit. supra note 86 at 225, 229.
125 Sections 7 and 8 refer to procedures to be observed where administrative
hearings are required by statute.
126 Cohen, op. cit. supra note 2, at 343.
127 Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 4, at 586-589.
128 Id. at 587.
129 Ibid.
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the course of the 1941 hearings; ...and that the language of
the present Act was specific evidence of congressional intent
to change the rule.1" 1
It is this writer's belief that Professor Dickinson's argument must fail in all particulars. In the first place, the cases
which he and Dean Stason rely on as horrible examples of
the Supreme Court's sanctioning of administrative decisions
based on a modicum of evidence, do not appear in that light
at all, as any dispassionate reading of the record will confirm. "' 2 It may be concluded that some circuit courts in the
past have not searched the record with as great thoroughness as might be expected. Nevertheless, the real explanation for the illusion in quarters that the "scintilla" had replaced the "substantial" evidence rule, lies in the fact that
disappointed litigants very often, and very normally, express
their chagrin in tirades of accusation at the tribunal which
has ruled against them. This has been especially true in new
and experimental fields such as that of labor relations.'
Unfortunately, this has had a tendency to obfuscate any accurate appraisal of the judicial machinations involved in applying the substantial evidence rule. Disappointment at
substantive results has lead to reckless and unsubstantiated
charges against procedural methods.
Assuming, however, that violations did exist in practice
in some instances, the next problem is to ascertain how Congress meant to handle the situation. Must reviewing courts
Id. at 588.
Professor Dickinson relies (as did Dean Stason in his testimony before the
Senate Subcommittee in 1941) on N.L.R.B. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309
U.S. 206, 60 S.Ct. 493, 84 L.Ed. 704 (1940) and N.L.R.B. v. Bradford Dyeing
130
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Ass'n., 310 U.S. 318, 60 S. Ct. 918, 84 L. Ed. 1226 (1940).

,

132 It is interesting to note that the cases which Professor Dickinsoh and
Dean Stason cite as examples of judicial review confined to finding a "scintilla" of
evidence are both National Labor Board cases. Other administrative agencies, such
as the Federal Trade Commission, have experienced the sometimes severe partisan
criticisms of its procedures when struggling through the embryonic period of their
existence. Novelty of administrative action often provokes unwarranted hostility.
See Testimony of Professor Schulman, Sen. Hearings (1941) 857.
13s Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 4, at 589.
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now weigh all the testimony or one side against that of the
other? Must they now decide in favor of the preponderance
of the evidence contained in the whole record? While Professor Dickinson does not go that far, he does assert that
Congress, by providing that the court "shall review the whole
record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any
party," has broadened the scope of judicial review of the evidence necessary to support administrative determinations."3 4
What Profssor Dickinson seems to have overlooked is that,
when Dean Stason presented his criticism of the alleged
"scintilla" rule to Congress, he proposed language, similar to
that of the present Act, which was to be a "clarification" of
the substantial evidence rule, not a broadened application
thereof.'
Several of the previous witnesses at the 1941
hearings, and, indeed, several of the members of the Senate
Subcommittee before whom the hearings were being conducted, had expressed doubt as to the exact meaning and
purpose of the requirement that review be "on the whole record" as contained in S. 674,136 which was the bill based on
the the findings of the minority report of the Attorney General's Committee. Therefore, Dean Stason made it unequivocally clear that the purpose of the phrase was not "to
broaden the review powers of the court.., to any extent." 11
Finally, to eliminate all confusion on the matter, the phrase
was altered in a memorandum submitted to Congress by the
minority of the Attorney General's Committee to read almost
exactly like the language in the Act as finally passed.'" 8
The later legislative history of the Act confirms the conclusion thus drawn from that of the earlier stages. Carl Mc184 Sen. Hearings (1941) 1357, 1359.
135 Id. at 372-374, 665, 853.
136 Id. at 1359. After this, Sen. O'Mahoney felt that he understood what the
phrase meant. Id. at 1360.
137 "In view of the doubts expressed, it is suggested that the phrase 'upon
the whole record' be eliminated or the phrase 'after consideration of the whole or
such parts of the record as may be cited by the parties be substituted." Id. at
p.1401. The latter suggestion was the one adopted.
188 House Hearings (1945) p. 37-40; Sen. Doc. 83-86.
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Farland, testifying at the 1945 hearings, reiterated the assurances given by Dean Stason that the Act did not alter the
substantial evidence rule and "reflected" the present judicial
rule." ' Senator Morse I" and Congressman Walter1 1
re-echoed these views on the floor of their respective chambers, and the Senate Sub-Committee was informed by the Attorney General that clause (5) was "intended to embody the
law as declared . . .142

These indicia of legislative intent

cannot be offset by reliance on loose talk on the floor of Congress expressing dissatisfaction with what was imagined to
be the practice of some courts to follow the "scintilla" formula.

143

This writer believes that in face of the available evidence
of legislative history, the only fair conclusion to be drawn
is that Congress did not mean to alter, in any way, the well
established substantial evidence rule.' 44 On the other hand,
Congress meant to issue a strong exhortation to these courts,
if any, who have fallen into the vice of relaxing that rule. No
longer can the "administrator or board.., base their finding
on the scintilla rule." 145 However, the Supreme Court has

never said that the requirements of the substantial evidence
rule can be satisfied by merely looking at one side of the record and picking enough evidence therefrom to support the
administrative decisions. After all, the substantial evidence
rule is merely the reasonable man fiction concealed in a new
semantic garb. Certainly, evidence from one side only, without an opportunity to weigh it against countervailing evidence, is not such evidence as would satisfy the ordinary
prudent man in reaching a decision. It seems apparent that
Section 10(e) neither makes nor mars the correct application
130

92 Cong. Rec. 2196 (March 12, 1946).
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92 Cong. Rec. 5760 (May 24, 1946).

141

Sen. Rep. 44; Sen. Doc. 230.

142

See, e.g., 92 Cong. Rec. 5762 (May 24, 1946).

143 To the same effect see Aroamiy GaxER's MA
144

92 Cong. Rec. 5765 (May 24, 1946).
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Nathanson, op. cit. supra note 2, 417.

Lua,
p. 109.
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of the substantial evidence, rule. But if those who think differently are appeased by the fact that they now have an additional probing device with which to psycho-analyze the
thought processes of individual judges, so be it.
Professor Nathanson has conjectured that Section 10(e)
might encourage the lower federal judges to greater independence of action in upsetting administrative determinations.146 Fortunately, cases decided since the Act has become law do not bear out that observation. Lower federal
courts have reaffirmed the substantial evidence rule as ap148
plied to the N. L. R. B.,' 47 the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
the S. E. C., 14 9 the F. T. C.,' 50 the Commissioner of Immi-

gration and Naturalization,' 5' and the Social Security
Board.' 52 In addition, the Supreme Court has applied it in
a recent case involving a fraud order by the Postmaster General.1
Opposed to these cases, there is a dicta in only two
cases to the effect that the Administrative Procedure Act has
broadened the scope of judicial review.' 3 One of the cases
where this opinion was expressed involved a habeas corpus
proceeding to review a deportation order. It has previously
been indicated in this article that some federal courts, especially the Supreme Court, are more strict in requiring compliance with the substantial evidence requisites when a threat
146 Donnelly Garment Co. v. N.L.R.B., 165 F.(2d) 940 (C.C.A. 8th 1948);
N.L.R.B. v. Consolidated Machine Tool Corp., 163 F.(2d) 376 (C.A.A. 2nd 1947);
E. Anthony & Sons, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 163 F.(2d) 22 (App. D.C., 1947).
147 Anderson v. Commissioner, 164 F.(2d) 870 (C.C.A. 7th 1948); Credit
Bureau of Greater New York, Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 F.(2d) 7 C.C.A. 7th
1947).
148 Norris & Hershberg, Inc. v. S.E.C., 163 F.(2d) 689 (App. D.C. 1947).
149 Callaghan & Co. v. F. T. C., 163 F. (2d) 359 (C.C.A. 7th 1947).
150 United Sttaes v. Jordan, 164 F.(2d) 633 (C.C.A. 7th 1948).
151 Ray v. Social Security Board, 73 F. Supp. 58 (S.D. Ala., 1947).
68 S. Ct. 591, 92 L.Ed. 440
15a Donaldson v. Read Magazine, .U.S.....,

(1948).
152 United States v. Watkins, 73 F. Supp. 216, 219 (S.D. N.Y., 1947), Lincoln Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 163 F.(2d) 379, 382 (C.C.A. 6th 1947). The dicta in the latter case is inconsistent with the result reached by the same court in
Commissioner v. Wiesler, 161 F.(2d) 997 (C.C.A. 6th 1947).
153 Supra note 76.
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to personal liberty, such as a deportation order, is involved." 4
If the only effect Section 10(e) is to make more federal
judges extra cautious in such situations this writer will be
delighted.
Concluding appraisal of the effect of Section 10(e) on the
substantial evidence rule it can be stated with some certainty
that no changes in law will ensue but that some changes in
practice may follow. Courts, however, Section 10 (e) or no
Section 10(e), will continue to find a way of sustaining administrative action of which they approve, and of setting
aside agency action where they do not approve of what the
agency is doing. 5 '
Clause (6) of Section 10(e) places the duty upon a reviewing court to upset administrative decisions "unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to
trial de novo by the reviewing court." Does this mean that
in every case where there is no statutorily prescribed administrative hearing a reviewing court must try the facts de
novo? There are rather sweeping statements found in both
Committee reports which would appear to provide an affirmative answer to that inquiry.'
This would mean that in
154 Whether the Taft-Hartley Act extends the substantial evidence rule as
far as court review of N.L.R.B. proceedings are concerned is not immediately clear
from the legislative history. 10(e) of that Act reads: "The findings of the Board
with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive.". Senator Morse, one of the authors of the provision, stated clearly that it was not the intent of the Senate to
broaden the test of judicial review stated by the Administrative Procedure AL.
43 Cong. Rec. 5289 (May 13, 1947). However, this statement was made before
the conference of House and Senate Committees from whose report an inference
to the contrary can be drawn that the Taft-Hartley bill goes further than the
Administrative Procedure Act and does attempt to broaden the scope of judicial review. See SEN. REP. oN S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 et seq. (1947).
Statutes which prescribe a broader scope of judicial review than the Administrative Procedure Act are not altered in that respect by the Act. See Section 12 of
the Act.
155 SEw. Comm. Pa.NT., p. 20; HousE REP., p. 45; SEN. Doc., pp. 39, 379.
156 United States ex. rel Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103, 47 S.Ct.
302, 71 L. Ed. 560 (1927).
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deportation ' and mail fraud cases,' 58 where administrative
hearings are held out of respect for due process requirements and are not prescribed by statute, the reviewing court
would try the facts de novo. In the past, judicial review has
been confined to a review of the record made in the agency
hearing to see whether the agency action is supported by
substantial evidence. Before concluding that Congress meant
to upset the existing application of judicial review in such
cases another look at the legislative history and the words of
the statute might be enlightening.
As clause (6) first stood when S.7 was first introduced in
the Senate, it contained an additional provision that "The
relevant -facts shall be tried and determined de novo by the
original court of review in all cases in which adjudications
are not required by statute to be made upon agency hearing."
(Italics supplied). This provision was omitted when the bill
was reported by the Senate Committee. Moreover, the language of clause (6) permits the court to overturn administrative action unwarranted by the facts only "to the extent
that the facts are subject to a trial de novo by the reviewing
court." (Italics supplied). It refers, obviously, to those
existing situations where judicial review has consisted of a
trial de novo, such as separation orders under the Interstate
Commerce Act and under the Packers and Stockyards Act.
The Committee reports cite the latter two examples to illustrate the broad language used in explaining the clause.'59 It
would appear that clause (6) merely restated the existing
state of affairs and will not increase the quantum of judicial
review to be applied in deportation and fraud order situations. At the most, clause (6) is a congressional request to
reviewing courts that, in cases where there is no statutory
157 Farley v. Simmons, 99 F. (2d) 343 (App. D. C. 1938), cert. den. 307 U. S.
22, 59 S. Ct. 694, 83 L.Ed. 1082 (1939).
158 S-upra note 155.
159 See Mr. Walter's statement to this effect in 92 Cong. Rec. 576 (May 24,
1946). See also McCarran, op. cit. supra note 5, at 831.
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hearing to which review is confined, they examine de novo
facts pertinent to questions of law.1 60 There is no evidence
to suggest that they have not usually done so in the past.
Cases decided since the passage of the Act bear out the
prediction that clause (6) worked no change in existing judicial review of administrative action where the administrative hearing was not one prescribed by statute. In United
States v. Jordan,6 ' the Seventh Circuit Court held that a
party ordered deported can, in a habeas corpus proceeding,
complain only that the administrative determination is manifestly unfair or without support of substantial evidence, or
that an error of law or clause of discretion has been committed; he may not obtain a trial de novo of the -issues on
evidence not submitted before the' administrative body.
Again, in United States v. Walkins,'62 a federal district court
judge, finding the deportation order of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization supported by substantial
evidence, refused, in a habeas corpus proceeding, to consider
the question of whether the reviewing court may grant a
trial de novo and take additional evidence under clause (6)
of the Administrative Procedure Act. Two other lower court
decisions have reaffirmed the existing rule that a suit to review a decision of the Commissioner of Patents, although in
form of an action de novo, is actually a proceeding to review
the ruling of an administrative agency. 6" As such, the substantial evidence rule will be the proper scope of judicial review, not a de novo proceeding. Moreover, the Supreme
Court recently reviewed a fraud order of the Postmaster
General without exhibiting any desire to apply a de novo review to his determination.' 64
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One final word concerning Section 10 serves to call attention to the innocuous appearing last clause of 10(e) which
entitles the reviewing court to take due account of the rule
of prejudicial error. This tail-end provision might, in the
long run, prove to be of great assistance to those reviewing
courts who are faced with technical procedural transgressions
on the part of administrative bodies but which do not deserve to be overturned without inviting a host of subsequent
dilatory and vexatious petitions for review based on procedural objections entirely.
Conclusion
At the risk of repetition, it can be concluded that the legislative intent behind the provisions of Section 10, taken individually or collectively, was to restate the existing principles
governing judicial review of administrative actions. These
principles had their genesis in the fertility of a judicial process which has been flexible enough to tolerate, and even to
encourage, the experimental solutions of the weighty social
problems of a modern industrial civilization within the proper framework of an institutionalized tradition of individual
liberty. The majority report of the Attorney General's Committee recognized the great accomplishment that our courts
thus have achieved.16 5 Consequently, they did not see fit to
recommend the enactment of congressional standards to
guide the courts in their review of administrative action,
feeling that most dissatisfaction with existing standards of
judicial review grew out of a dissatisfaction with the procedures of administrative tribunals.' 6 It was their rationale
that with reform of the administrative process itself, the need
for more stringent congressional directives on judicial review
would decrease. On the other hand, the minority of the
Committee, while recognizing the need of maintaining the
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maneuveribility of the experimental approach in the field of
judicial review, expressed the desire that Congress should
provide more definitely by general legislation for both the
availability and scope of judicial review in order to reduce
uncertainty and variability." 7
It must be conceded that, as far as judicial review alone is
concerned, the Administrative Procedure Act represents a
triumph for the minority view of the Attorney General's
Committee. Section 10 most surely is an expression of congressional standards to govern judicial review of administrative action. However, this is not to say, by any means, that
Congress has abrogated the old, or created new standards of
judicial review. As has been attempted to be demonstrated
in this article, the Congress has merely restated the homemade principles which the judicial process already had fashioned. In this sense, the Administrative Procedure Act, taken as a whole, reflects more the view of the majority of the
Attorney General's Committee. It is the agencies themselves who must provide the final answer in the quest for fair
administrative procedure.
As they comply with the statutory requisites of fair procedure available to the parties before them, the courts will find less need for severity in the
doses of judicial review which they are called upon to dispense.
This does not mean that the Administrative Procedure Act
may not encourage some courts to a "judicial activism" in
their review of administrative action. The cases decided
since the act do not betray any such general trend away from
their previous attitude of "judicial self denial"; but what
the future will bear must remain a conjecture.
On the positive side, Section 10 does represent a fine effort
to bestow the garb of statutory certainty upon the illusive
principles of judicial review. To the extent it succeeds, in
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that endeavor it simplifies as well as directs the administrative process and also the judicial process. The danger is,
however, that this pursuit for certainty in the embryonic
field of administrative procedure may come to resemble the
chase of Syrinx by Pan. Just as we come to think that we
have grasped the living body of statutory certitude, it well
may turn out to be the dry reed of jurisprudential ossification, both on the judicial and the administrative level. Let
us cautiously salute this effort of Congress to protect individual rights from the alleged sins of bureaucratic caprice; but
let us recall to them that up to now our courts have not been
slumbering on that job. It would be a great tragedy if the
late-comers, in their zeal to do something, should impose
crippling statutory fetters upon a judicial process which thus
far has permitted administrative efficiency without allowing
it to transgress the bounds of individual liberty.*
Alfred Long Scanlan

*Since this article has gone to the printer, several relevant decisions worthy of
comment have been handed down. In one case, the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act does not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear a complaint, seeking
to have a certification of a bargaining representative by the National Mediation
Board, declared null and void. The decision in the Switchman's Union case,
supra note 17, was reaffirmed, the court saying that the Railway Labor Act is a
statute which has been interpreted to "withhold" judicial review. Consequently,
judicial review is "precluded" within the meaning of Section 10. Kirkland et al.
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 166 F. (2d) .... (C. C. A. D. C., 1948).
In another recent decision, a federal district court relying on the' Trinler v.
Carusi decision, supra note 73, held that a deportation order can be reviewed
under Section 10 by any district court to which a petition for habeas corpus
would lie. The court quoted extensively from a student note in 96 University of
Penn. L. R. 269 (1947), in which the excellent point was made that previous decisions had not conclusively demonstrated an intent to restrain the character of
judicial review as opposed to its scope. (Italics supplied). The student writer
argued that the allowance of review of deportation proceedings under Section 10,
in addition to the well recognized habeas corpus remedy, would not impair the
deportation process, and would be more consonant with our philosophy of personal
liberty. We thus have another decision sustaining the hopeful prophecy that Section 10 might enlarge the availability of review in the sphere of personal liberty.
United States ex rel. Cammarata v. Miller, 76 F. Supp .... (S. D. N. Y., 1948).

